A security evaluation of the salsa anonymous communication system by Mittal, Prateek
c© 2010 Prateek Mittal
A SECURITY EVALUATION OF THE SALSA ANONYMOUS
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
BY
PRATEEK MITTAL
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010
Urbana, Illinois
Adviser:
Assistant Professor Nikita Borisov
ABSTRACT
We evaluate a state of the art P2P anonymous communication system,
Salsa. Salsa is based on a distributed hash table, and uses secure lookups to
locate relays for anonymous communication. To analyze user anonymity in
Salsa, we first build an analytic model for the lookup security in Salsa, and
model its path building mechanism as a stochastic activity network in the
Mo¨bius framework.
Next, we analyze information leaks in the lookup mechanisms of Salsa
and show how these leaks can be used to compromise anonymity. We show
that the techniques that are used to combat active attacks on the lookup
mechanism dramatically increase information leaks and increase the efficacy
of passive attacks. Thus there is a tradeoff between active and passive
attacks. We find that, by combining both passive and active attacks,
anonymity can be compromised much more effectively than previously
thought.
We also show that Salsa is vulnerable to a selective DoS attack, where an
adversary denies service whenever he/she is unable to compromise user
anonymity. This attack is devastating for user anonymity in Salsa,
rendering the system insecure for most proposed uses. Finally, we perform
a first step towards an entropy based evaluation of Salsa, instead of
considering the binary metric of path compromise, which results in an even
lower user anonymity. Our study therefore motivates the search for new
approaches to P2P anonymous communication.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication hides the identity of communication partners
from third parties, or hides user identity from the remote party. The Tor
network [1], deployed in 2003, now serves hundreds of thousands of users
and carries terabytes of traffic a day [2]. Originally an experimental
network used by privacy enthusiasts, it is now entering mainstream use; for
example, several consulates were found to be using it to evade observation
by their host country [3].
The capacity of Tor is already strained, and to support a growing
population a peer-to-peer approach will likely be necessary, as P2P
networks allow the network capacity to scale with the number of users.
Indeed, several proposals for peer-to-peer anonymous communication have
been put forward [4, 5, 6, 7]. Salsa is the state of art in peer-to-peer
anonymous communication systems, and the subject of this thesis. We
present an overview of Salsa in Chapter 2, describing its lookup and path
building mechanisms. We also discuss its threat model, in addition to
motivating the need for scalable approaches to anonymous communication.
Prior work on analyzing Salsa used the help of simulations to analyze the
lookup security and user anonymity. Our first contribution in this thesis is
a theoretical analysis of Salsa. We present an analytic model for lookup
security in Salsa, as well as a stochastic activity network to model
anonymous path construction in Salsa. We provide a description of the
theoretical model in Chapter 3.
A key challenge in peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems is the
ability to locate relays for anonymous traffic. In Tor, clients use a directory
to retrieve a list of all the running routers. Such a directory will not scale as
the number of routers grows, since the traffic to update the directory would
become prohibitively expensive. Instead, a peer-to-peer lookup is needed to
locate an appropriate relay. Such a lookup, however, can be subject to
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attack: malicious nodes can misdirect it to find relays that are colluding
and violate the anonymity of the entire system. All of the P2P anonymous
communication designs therefore incorporate some defense against such
attacks; e.g. AP3 [4] uses secure routing techniques developed by Castro et
al [8], and Salsa uses redundant routing with bounds checks [5].
These defenses, however, come at a cost. They operate by performing
extra checks to detect incorrect results returned by malicious nodes. These
checks cause many messages to be exchanged between nodes in the
network, some of which might be observed by attackers. As a result, a
relatively small fraction of attackers can make observations about a large
fraction of lookups that occur in the P2P network, acting as a near-global
passive adversary. As most modern anonymity systems assume that a
global passive adversary is too costly, they are not designed to resist such
attacks. Therefore, this small fraction of attackers can successfully attack
anonymity of the system.
Our next contribution is the analysis of such information leak attacks in
Salsa. We find that defenses against active attacks create new opportunities
for passive attacks. Salsa makes heavy use of redundancy to address active
attacks, rendering it vulnerable to passive information leak attacks.
Further, increasing the levels of redundancy will improve passive attack
performance, and often make the system weaker overall. We find that even
in the best case, Salsa is much less secure than previously considered. Salsa
was designed to tolerate up to 20% of compromised nodes; however, our
analysis shows that in this case, over one quarter of all paths will be
compromised by using information leaks. We also studied potential
improvements to Salsa that can be achieved by increasing the path length
or introducing a public key infrastructure (PKI). We found that these tools
offer only a limited defense against our attacks. We discuss and analyze
these information leak attacks in Chapter 4.
Next, we consider a selective denial-of-service attack on Salsa. Instead of
blanket denial-of-service attack, an adversary may selectively affect
reliability of the system in states that are hardest to compromise, thereby
causing the system to enter less secure states. In particular, we explore an
attack where DoS is performed whenever communication cannot be
compromised. Such selective DoS is both easier to carry out than an attack
on the entire system, and can be more effective; instead of driving the users
2
away from the system, selective DoS presents them with a less reliable, but
still functional system. Faced with poor reliability, many users will
naturally attempt the communication again, presenting more opportunities
for attack. In Chapter 5, we show that the selective DoS attack is
devastating for user anonymity in Salsa; at 20% compromised nodes, the
probability of path compromise is 0.7, thus rendering the system insecure
for most proposed uses.
Conventional anonymity analysis of Salsa considers the binary metric of
path compromise. Even our model for information leak attacks discussed
earlier is restricted to the scenario where the adversary is able to precisely
identify the initiator of a lookup. In Chapter 6, we extend our model by
performing a first step towards an entropy based evaluation of Salsa, that
considers a distribution of possible initiators of a lookup. We show that an
entropy based model for information leaks results in an even lower user
anonymity. Our results demonstrate that information leaks are an
important part of anonymity analysis of a system and that new advances in
the state of the art of P2P anonymous communication are needed. Finally,
we discuss the related work in Chapter 7, and conclude in Chapter 8.
3
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we present a brief overview of anonymous communication.
We motivate the need for decentralized and scalable solutions, and discuss
why structured peer-to-peer systems have strong potential. We then
describe our threat model, as well as the design of Salsa.
2.1 Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems
Anonymous communication systems can be classified into low-latency and
high-latency systems. High latency anonymous communication systems like
Mixminion [9] and Mixmaster [10] are designed to be secure even against a
powerful global passive adversary; however, the message transmission times
for such systems are typically on the order of several hours. This makes
them unsuitable for use in applications involving interactive traffic like web
browsing and instant messaging. The focus of this paper is on low-latency
anonymous communication systems.
Tor [1] is a popular low-latency anonymous communication system. Users
(clients) download a list of servers from central directory authorities and
build anonymous paths using onion routing [11]. There are several
problems with Tor’s architecture. First, the reliance on central directory
authorities makes them an attractive target for the attackers. Second, Tor
serves hundreds of thousands of users and the use of a relatively small
number of servers to build anonymous paths becomes a performance
bottleneck. Finally, Tor requires all users to maintain a global view of all
the servers. As the number of servers increases, maintaining a global view
of the system becomes costly, since churn will cause frequent updates and a
large bandwidth overhead. In order to address these problems, a
peer-to-peer architecture will likely be necessary. However, peer-to-peer
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networks present new challenges to anonymity, one of which is the ability to
locate relays for anonymous traffic.
Several designs for peer-to-peer low-latency anonymous communication
have been proposed. Tarzan [6] replaced the centralized directory authority
with a gossip protocol that was used to distribute knowledge of all peers to
all other peers. While decentralized, the requirement that each node
maintain an up-to-date global view of the system means that the system
could scale only to about 10,000 nodes. MorphMix [7] was designed to scale
to much larger network sizes. It built an unstructured peer-to-peer overlay
between all the relays and created paths along this overlay to forward
anonymous communications. In MorphMix, a node along the path is
queried for its neighbors in order to choose the next hop. To prevent the
node from providing malicious results, a scheme using witness nodes and a
collusion detection mechanism is used. However, the collusion detection
mechanism can be circumvented by a set of colluding adversaries who model
the internal state of each node, thus violating anonymity guarantees [12].
Several other designs have used so-called structured peer-to-peer
topologies [4, 5], also known as distributed hash tables (DHTs), as a
foundation for anonymous peer-to-peer communication. Structured
topologies assign neighbor relationships using a pseudorandom but
deterministic mathematical formula based on the IP addresses or public
keys of nodes. This allows the relationships to be verified externally,
presenting fewer opportunities for attacks. Salsa [5] is the state of art
design, which aims to offer secure P2P anonymous communication in a
system without a PKI. Its design includes a custom DHT structure and a
custom secure lookup mechanism specifically tailored for the purposes of
anonymous communication. Its secure lookup and path construction
mechanisms rely heavily on redundancy to detect potential attacks. As we
will show, such redundancy creates information leaks, presenting a trade-off
between resisting active attacks and presenting more opportunities for
passive attacks, as well as makes Salsa more vulnerable to a selective DoS
attack.
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2.2 Threat Model
Low-latency anonymous communication systems are not designed to to be
secure against a global passive adversary. We consider a partial adversary
who controls a fraction f of all the nodes in the network. This set of
malicious nodes colludes and can launch both passive and active attacks.
We consider the set of colluding nodes to be static and the adversary
cannot compromise nodes at will. In terms of the standard terminology
introduced by [13], our adversary is internal, active and static.
Even in networks with large numbers of nodes, f can be a significant
fraction of the network size. Most peer-to-peer systems including Salsa use
mechanisms to prevent Sybil attacks [14], which would allow an adversary
to attain an f arbitrarily close to 1. However, powerful adversaries, such as
governments or large organizations, can potentially deploy enough nodes to
gain a significant fraction of the network. Similarly, botnets, whose size is
often measured in tens of thousands of nodes [15, 16], present a very real
threat to anonymity.
2.3 Salsa
Salsa [5] is an anonymous communication system designed to overcome the
scalability problems in traditional mix systems. As in Tor, a circuit is built
between the initiator and the recipient via proxy routers (nodes) for
anonymous communication. Layered encryption ensures that each node
knows only its previous and next hop in the circuit. The nodes used for the
circuits are randomly selected from the global pool of nodes, even though
each node has only local knowledge of a small subset of the network.
2.3.1 Salsa Architecture
Salsa is based on a distributed hash table (DHT) that maps nodes to a
point in an ID space corresponding to the hash of their IP address. The ID
space in Salsa is divided into equal sized groups, organized into a binary
tree structure. Each node knows all the nodes in its group (local contacts),
and a small number of nodes nodes in other groups (global contacts). Each
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node maintains one global contact for every level of the binary tree. At
every level, the global contact is selected at random from the subtree
corresponding to the other child of the node’s parent at that level.
There are two basic mechanisms in Salsa: (1) a node lookup mechanism
and (2) a circuit building mechanism. The former returns the IP address
and public key of node in the DHT closest to a given point in the ID space.
The latter is used to build a Tor-like tunnel.
2.3.2 Salsa Secure Lookup
Similar to Pastry, nodes must rely on other nodes to perform a recursive
lookup. The initiator of the lookup contacts its global contact in the same
subtree as the destination identifier to continue the lookup. The lookup
proceeds in a recursive fashion until the destination identifier is in the same
subgroup as the intermediate requesting node; in this case, the intermediate
requesting node can simply return the IP address and public key of the
closest node to the destination identifier.
A malicious node who intercepts the request could return the identity of
a collaborating attacker node. Salsa makes use of redundant routing and
bounds checks to reduce the lookup bias. The Salsa binary tree architecture
is designed to ensure that redundant paths have very few common nodes
between them (unlike Pastry or Chord [17]). This reduces the likelihood
that a few nodes will be able to modify the results for all the redundant
requests. A lookup initiator asks r local contacts (chosen at random) to
perform a lookup for a random key. The returned value that is closest to
the key is selected and a bounds check is performed. If the distance
between the prospective owner and the key is greater than a threshold
distance b, it is rejected, reasoning that malicious nodes are less dense than
honest ones and thus will fail the bounds check much more frequently. If
the bounds check test fails, the result of the lookup is discarded and
another lookup for a new random key is performed. Redundant routing and
the bounds check work together: an attacker would need to both intercept
all of the redundant lookups and have a malicious node that is close enough
to avoid the bounds check.
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Figure 2.1: Salsa path construction.
2.3.3 Salsa Circuit Construction
To build a circuit, the initiator chooses r random IDs ([5] sets r = 3) and
redundantly looks up the corresponding nodes (called the first set/stage of
nodes). Keys are established with each of these nodes. Each of the first set
of nodes does a single lookup for r additional nodes (second set of nodes).
A circuit is built to each of the nodes in the second group, relayed through
one of the nodes in the first group. Again, the initiator instructs the second
set of nodes (via the circuits) to do a lookup for a final node. One of the
paths created between the first and the second set of nodes is selected and
the final node is added to the circuit. We use the parameter l to refer to
the number of stages in the circuit ([5] sets l = 3). Figure 2.1 depicts the
Salsa path building mechanism for r = 3 and l = 3. Note that redundant
lookups are used only to look up the nodes in the first stage; later lookups
rely on the redundancy in the path building mechanism itself.
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CHAPTER 3
AN ANALYTIC MODEL FOR SALSA
3.1 Analytic Model for Lookup
We denote the initiator of the lookup as I, and the target identifier as ID.
Let us consider the following two possibilities, as depicted in Figure 3.1. In
the first scenario, the node corresponding to ID is malicious, which
happens with probability f . If this malicious node passes the bounds check
(with probability 1−∆1), the resulting lookup is compromised. If this
malicious node fails the bounds check (with probability ∆1), the lookup is
aborted and I performs a lookup for some other identifier. In the second
scenario, the node corresponding to ID is honest. The following cases are
possible in this scenario: (a) There is at least one lookup path with all
honest nodes (the probability of which is denoted by g). Now if the honest
node corresponding to ID succeeds the bounds check (with probability
1−∆1), the lookup is successful, else if the honest node fails the bounds
check (with probability ∆1), the lookup is aborted. (b) Every lookup path
has at least one malicious node (with probability 1− g). Now, if there is a
malicious node within bounds (with probability ∆2), the resulting lookup is
compromised, otherwise the lookup is aborted.
∆1 is the probability of false positives: i.e. there is no node with an
identifier in the range between between target ID and ID + b, where b is
the bounds check parameter. If we consider the ID space to be of unit size,
then ∆1 can be computed as
∆1 = (1− b)
N (3.1)
∆2 is the probability of a false negative: i.e. given that the target node is
honest, there is a malicious node within bounds. Suppose that the target
9
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Figure 3.1: Computing probability of compromised lookup.
node is at a distance a from ID. The cumulative density function (CDF) of
this distance is given by F (a) = (1− a)N , and the PDF is given by
f(a) = N · (1− a)N−1. Now, we have that
∆2 = P (malicious node within bounds| target node is honest) (3.2a)
∆2 = 1− P (malicious node outside bounds|target node is honest) (3.2b)
∆2 = 1−
∫ b
a=0
f(a) · (
1− b
1− a
)N ·f da.−
∫ 1
a=b
f(a) · 1 da. (3.2c)
∆2 = 1−
∫ b
a=0
N · (1− a)N−1 · (
1− b
1− a
)N ·f da.−
∫ 1
a=b
N · (1− a)N−1 da.
(3.2d)
∆2 = 1−N · (1− b)
N ·f ·
1− (1− b)N−N ·f
N −N · f
−∆1 (3.2e)
The term g is the probability that there is at least one lookup path with
all honest nodes. This probability depends on the lookup path lengths. For
simplicity, let us first consider the case of a single lookup (r = 1). We shall
later extend our analysis for redundant lookups.
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Figure 3.2: Salsa binary tree structure.
3.1.1 Single Lookup, r = 1
Let us denote the lookup path length by L. Given a particular lookup path
length (L = l), we have that
g = (1− f)l (3.3)
Based on the Figure 3.1, we have that
P (Compromised Lookup|L = l) =
f · (1−∆1) + (1− f) · (1− g) ·∆2
f · (1−∆1) + (1− f) · (1− g) ·∆2 + (1− f) · g · (1−∆1)
(3.4)
where ∆1,∆2, g have been computed in Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3).
Now we shall compute P (L = l). Let D denote the distance between the
initiator I’s group and target ID’s group in terms of the number of levels of
the binary tree structure. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. In order to
compute P (L = l), we can first condition on the event D = d. Since I
selects the target ID uniformly at random from the ID space, the
probability that the target is d levels away from the initiator in the binary
tree structure is
P (D = d) =
{
2d−1
G
d ≥ 1
1
G
d = 0
(3.5)
Under the event D = d, we shall compute the probability of lookup path
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length being l hops, i.e. P (L = l|D = d). The lookup from I to ID can
proceed along several different paths, depending on local contact chosen by
the initiator. Note that the first hop is always a local contact in the
initiators group, and the last hop is always in the target group. Thus we
need to select l − 2 more hops from among the d− 1 possible subgroup
levels relative to the target ID, where the probability of selecting any
subgroup level is 1/2. Thus, given D = d, the total number of possible
lookup paths of length l is
(
d−1
l−2
)
, where the probability of selecting any
individual path is (1
2
)d−1. From the above, we have that
P (L = l|D = d) =


(
d−1
l−2
)
(1
2
)d−1 d ≥ 1
1 d = 0, l = 1
0 d = 0, l > 1
(3.6)
Using Equations (3.5) and (3.6), we can compute P (L = l) as follows:
P (L = l) =
log G∑
d=0
P (L = l|D = d) · P (D = d) (3.7a)
P (L = l) =
{ ∑log G
d=1
(
d−1
l−2
)
· 1
G
l ≥ 2
1
G
l = 1
(3.7b)
Finally, using Equations (3.4) and (3.7) we can compute the probability of
a compromised lookup as follows:
P (Compromised Lookup) =
log G+1∑
l=1
P (Compromised Lookup|L = l)·P (L = l)
(3.8)
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3.1.2 Redundant Lookups
Let us denote the r lookup path lengths by L1, L2...Lr. Given particular
lookup path lengths (L1 = l1...Lr = lr), we have that
g = P (at least one lookup path is honest) (3.9a)
g = 1− P (all lookup paths have a malicious node) (3.9b)
g = 1−
r∏
j=1
1− (1− f)lj (3.9c)
Based on the Figure 3.1, we have that
P (Compromised Lookup|L1 = l1..Lr = lr) =
f · (1−∆1) + (1− f) · (1− g) ·∆2
f · (1−∆1) + (1− f) · (1− g) ·∆2 + (1− f) · g · (1−∆1)
(3.10)
where ∆1,∆2, g have been computed in equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.9).
Now we shall compute P (L1 = l1..Lr = lr) by conditioning on the event
D = d. Note that conditioned on D = d, the redundant lookups are
independent. Thus, we have that
P (L1 = l1..Lr = lr|D = d) =
r∏
j=1
P (Lj = lj|D = d) (3.11)
Using Equation (3.11), we can compute P (L1 = l1..Lr = lr) as follows :
P (L1 = l1..Lr = lr) =
log G∑
d=0
P (L1 = l1..Lr = lr|D = d) · P (D = d) (3.12a)
P (L1 = l1..Lr = lr) =
log G∑
d=0
(
r∏
j=1
P (Lj = lj|D = d)) · P (D = d) (3.12b)
where P (L = l|D = d) and P (D = d) are given by Equations (3.6) and
(3.5). Finally, using Equations (3.10) and (3.12) we can compute the
probability of a compromised lookup as follows:
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P (Compromised Lookup) =
log G+1∑
l1=1
..
log G+1∑
lr=1
P (Compromised Lookup|L1 = l1..Lr = lr)·P (L1 = l1..Lr = lr)
(3.13)
3.2 Analytic Model for Circuit Construction
The path construction mechanism in Salsa is quite complex, and difficult to
model by hand. Instead, we will model it as a stochastic activity network
(SAN) using the Mo¨bius framework [18].
3.2.1 Mo¨bius Framework
Mo¨bius is a multi-formalism, multi-solution framework for computer
systems analysis. While originally designed for systems level performance
analysis (reliability, availability), its flexibility has enabled its application to
a wide range of discrete event systems including modeling attacks on secure
systems. The main components of Mo¨bius are as follows:
• Atomic Models: Mo¨bius supports stochastic extensions to Petri-Nets,
Markov chains and extensions, and stochastic process algebras. We
will use the formalism of stochastic activity network to describe the
path construction in Salsa.
• Reward Variables: Reward variables allow for detailed customized
measurement of the system properties, including periodic
measurements and measurements at the steady state. Our approach is
to define a state in the SAN model indicating the compromise of user
anonymity, and then measure the steady state properties of that state.
• Study: The study component allows us to define input parameters to
the model, and then study the behavior of the system over a wide
range of input parameter values. We use the number of nodes in each
stage of path building (r), and the number of stages (l) as inputs to
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the analytic model. This enables us to compute anonymity over
different possible choices of r, l in Salsa.
• Solver: Mo¨bius allows for both distributed discrete event simulation
as well numerical solution techniques. We will use the numerical
solution technique to solve the SAN model, because it is able to
compute exact solutions to models with tens of millions of states.
We shall now describe the SAN model for Salsa path construction.
3.2.2 Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) Model for Path
Construction
Stochastic activity networks are a convenient, graphical, high level language
for describing system behavior. SANs consist of the following:
• Place: places are like variables, and contain tokens, which are the
value of the place (variable).
• Transition and Cases: transitions change the value of the state, and
cases are used to specify probabilistic choices.
• Input Gates: connect states to transitions, and are used to define
complex enabling and completion functions.
• Output Gates: connect transitions to states, and are used to define
complex completion functions.
Figure 3.3 depicts the SAN model for path construction in Salsa. The
state place is a complex data structure comprising a Boolean variable for all
nodes in the path building process (r · (l − 1) + 1) and two integer variables
for recording the current node (denoted by q, s.t. 1 ≤ q ≤ r · (l− 1) + 1)and
the current stage (denoted by k, s.t. 1 ≤ k ≤ l) of the process. The Boolean
variables indicate whether the selected nodes are honest or malicious. The
current stage of the process is initialized as q = 0, k = 0.
The input gate ig is enabled as long as k ≤ l − 1. If the input gate ig is
enabled, then the transition set malicious computes the probabilities of the
nodes in the next stage being malicious, based on the number of honest
15
Figure 3.3: Stochastic activity network for path construction in Salsa.
nodes in the previous stage. Notice that if x nodes in the k′th stage are
malicious, then effectively, only r − x nodes are performing lookups for the
nodes in the next stage k + 1, and we can compute the probabilities of
nodes in the next stage being honest using the analytic model for lookup
developed earlier and setting the number of redundant lookups to r − x.
Note that for the first stage, we set x = 0, as all the lookups are performed
by the initiator.
Suppose the set malicious function computes the probability of nodes in
the next stage being honest as p, then with probability p, output gate og1
is chosen and it sets the Boolean variable corresponding to the current node
in the current stage as honest. With probability 1− p, output gate og2 is
chosen, and it sets the Boolean variable corresponding to the current node
in the current stage as malicious. Both output gates og1 and og2 also
increment the current value of the current node (q). Furthermore if
q%r == 0, then the value of the current stage is incremented (k ++). Note
that the last stage is an exception as only one node needs to be selected.
16
When the value of k reaches l, the input gate ig is disabled, and the node
selection procedure is complete. Using the power of cases in transitions, we
have been able to model the cascading effect in the Salsa path building
process, i.e., the choice of nodes in a stage affects the choice of nodes in the
next stage.
The input gate finish is enabled when the value of k is equal to l. The
transition decision encodes the attacker’s algorithm once the node selection
process is finished, e.g., passive timing analysis attacks. If the attack is
successful, the output gate m is selected which increments the value of the
malicious place (which acts as an absorbing state). Otherwise, the output
gate s is selected which increments the value of the success place. The
other modules in the Figure 3.3 correspond to attacks discussed in the
future chapters. The modules corresponding to stage1 and stage2 are used
for passive bridging attacks described in Chapter 4, while the abort module
is used for the selective denial of service attack described in Chapter 5. We
set the reward variables in the Mo¨bius framework to be the values of the
places malicious and success, and compute the final probability of user
compromise as malicious
malicious+success
.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION LEAKS ATTACKS ON
SALSA
4.1 Information Leaks via Secure Lookups
It has been recognized that unprotected DHTs are extremely vulnerable to
attacks on the lookup mechanism. First of all, malicious nodes can perform
a Sybil attack [14] and join the network many times, increasing the fraction
f . Second, they can intercept lookup requests and return incorrect results
by listing a colluding malicious node as the closest node to a key, increasing
the fraction of lookups that return malicious nodes. Finally, they can
interfere with the routing table maintenance and cause the routing tables of
honest nodes to contain a larger fraction of malicious nodes; this will
increase the chance that a lookup can be intercepted and the result can be
subverted.
In Chapter 3, we have seen how Salsa makes use of redundant routing
and bounds checks to reduce the lookup bias. The Salsa architecture is
designed to ensure that redundant paths have very few common nodes
between them (unlike Pastry or Chord [17]). This reduces the likelihood
that a few nodes will be able to modify the results for all the redundant
requests. A lookup initiator asks r local contacts (chosen at random) to
perform a lookup for a random key. The returned value that is closest to
the key is selected and a bounds check is performed. If the distance
between the prospective owner and the key is greater than a threshold
distance b, it is rejected, reasoning once again that malicious nodes are less
dense than honest ones and thus will fail the bounds check much more
frequently. If the bounds check test fails, the result of the lookup is
discarded and another lookup for a new random key is performed.
Redundant routing and the bounds check work together: an attacker would
need to both intercept all of the redundant lookups and have a malicious
18
node that is close enough to avoid the bounds check.
To validate our mathematical model of Salsa lookup, we used a simulator
developed by the authors of Salsa [19].1 The simulator was configured to
simulate 1000 topologies, and in each topology, results were averaged over
1000 random lookups. The lookup bias is sensitive to the average lookup
path length, which in turn is about log2 |G|, where |G| is the number of
groups. This is because longer path lengths give attackers more
opportunities to intercept the lookup and subvert the result. We therefore
used 128 groups, which would be a typical number in a large network, and
1000 nodes in our simulation.
The choice of the parameter b has an interesting tradeoff. Decreasing the
bounds checking distance will increase the probability that a legitimate root
of the key lies outside bounds. This scenario is a false positive. An increase
in b would lead to a reduction in false positives, but then attackers could
have some nodes that are within the bounds of a random key, even if they
are not the root (false negatives). Thus if we decrease the false positives by
increasing the bounds checking distance, the false negatives will increase. A
practical strategy is to keep the false positives small by having a relatively
higher b, and to reduce the false negatives by making use of diverse paths
(redundant routing). Salsa sets the bounds checking distance as
b = offset · groupsize; the corresponding false positives in bounds checking
can be computed as (1− b)N . For 128 groups and 1000 nodes, using an
offset value of 0.5 results in less than 2% false positives. We shall use this
value in the remainder of our analysis. Note that the false positives should
be small for performance reasons, else the lookup initiator would have to
perform many lookups to get a root which is within bounds.
Salsa is resistant to conventional attacks that target the lookup
mechanism as long as the fraction of malicious nodes in the system is less
that 20%. Since Salsa does not provide adequate security for higher values
of f , we shall limit our analysis to low values. In Figure 4.1, we study the
effect of varying redundancy on the lookup bias. First, we note that the
simulation estimates closely match our analytic results. Second, we can see
that increasing r clearly reduces the fraction of compromised lookups, thus
increasing security. For f = 0.2, the fraction of compromised lookups drops
1Our results differ slightly from those shown in [5] because of a bug in the simulator.
We have communicated the bug to the authors and it has been accepted.
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of compromised lookups.
from 37% to 25% when r is increased from 2 to 6.
However, the secure lookup mechanism generates many extra messages:
redundant routing sends a request across several paths. These messages let
attackers detect when a lookup has been performed between two honest
nodes with high probability. In particular, the initiator of a lookup can be
precisely identified by the attackers if any of the local contacts used for
redundant lookups are compromised. The probability of detecting the
lookup initiator is 1− (1− f)r, as depicted in Figure 4.2. Clearly, increasing
r increases the chance that a lookup initiator is detected. This illustrates
the trade-off between security and anonymity of a lookup. We also note
that information leaks are inherent in other secure routing protocols as
well, like that of Castro et al. [8]. In fact, for Castro et al. [8], when only
5% nodes are malicious, they observe more than 60% of all lookups. AP3 is
an anonymity system based on the secure lookup mechansim of Castro et
al. [8], and we have analyzed its security in the Appendix.
This shows the fundamental tension that is encountered by a DHT
lookup. The default DHT mechanisms provide little defense against active
adversaries who try to disrupt the lookup process, dramatically increasing
the probability that a lookup returns a compromised node. Salsa’s secure
routing mechanisms solve this problem, but introduce another, as the
lookup is no longer anonymous and can be observed by malicious nodes. A
relatively small fraction of malicious nodes can, therefore, act as a
near-global passive adversary and compromise the security of anonymous
communication systems. The secure lookup exposes nodes to increased
surveillance; we note that this may have consequences for protocols other
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Figure 4.2: Information leaks from secure lookups.
than anonymous communication that are built on top of secure lookup. So
far, we have observed a tradeoff between security and anonymity of a
lookup; we shall now use this to break the user anonymity in Salsa.
4.2 Attacks on Salsa Path Construction
We shall now analyze Salsa’s path building mechanism. For anonymous
communication, a path is built between the initiator and the recipient via
proxy routers (nodes). Layered encryption ensures that each node knows
only its previous and next hop in the path. The nodes used for the paths
are randomly selected from the global pool of nodes, even though each node
has only local knowledge of a small subset of the network.
4.2.1 Active Path Compromise Attacks on Salsa
Active attacks on the lookup mechanism can bias the probability that
nodes involved in Salsa’s path building mechanism are compromised.
Borisov et al. [20] noted that Salsa path building is also subject to a public
key modification attack.2 If all the nodes in a particular stage are
compromised, they can modify the public keys of the next set of nodes
being looked up. This attack defeats Salsa’s bounds check algorithm that
ensures the IP address is within the right range, since it cannot detect an
incorrect public key. Also, since the traffic toward the node whose public
2Their analysis did not take into account the lookup bias.
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key has been modified is forwarded via corrupt nodes, the attackers are
guaranteed to intercept the messages. They can then complete the path
building process by emulating all remaining stages (and hence, the last
node). The public key modification attack and attacks on Salsa lookup
mechanism are active attacks. Now, by end-to-end timing analysis, the
path will be compromised if the first and last nodes in the circuit are
compromised. Conventional analysis of anonymous communication
typically focuses on minimizing the chance of path compromise attacks. By
increasing the redundancy in the path building mechanism, this chance can
be minimized. This is because increasing r decreases the chance of both
active attacks on lookups as well as public key modification attacks.
We now describe three types of passive information leak attacks on Salsa.
We shall also show that increasing redundancy increases the effectiveness of
the information leak attacks, resulting in a trade-off between robustness
against active attacks and passive information leak attacks.
4.2.2 Conventional Continuous Stage Attack
A path in Salsa can be compromised if there is at least one attacker node in
every stage of the path. Suppose that there are attacker nodes A1, A2, A3 in
the three stages respectively. In the path building mechanism, a node
performs a lookup for all r nodes in the following stage implying that A1
would have looked up A2 and A2 would have looked up A3. Hence the
attacker can easily (passively) bridge the first and last stages, thereby
compromising the anonymity of the system. This attack was mentioned
in [5]. Note that if we increase redundancy as per conventional analysis, the
effectiveness of the continuous stage attack also increases. This is because
increasing redundancy increases the chance that attackers are present in
each stage (which is 1− (1− f)r), giving them more opportunities to
launch this attack. Next, we shall describe two new bridging attacks also
based on information leaks from lookups.
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Figure 4.3: Bridging an honest first stage.
4.2.3 Bridging an Honest First Stage
This attack is based on the observation that the initiator performs
redundant lookups for the nodes in the first stage. If the adversary can
deduce the identities of the nodes in the first stage (they need not be
compromised), and detect any of the initiator’s redundant lookups for
nodes in the first stage, the anonymity of the system is compromised.
Consider Figure 4.3; malicious nodes are depicted in black. The first stage
(A1, B1, C1) is comprised solely of honest nodes, the second stage
(A2, B2, C2) has all malicious nodes and the third stage node A3 is also
compromised. The attackers know the identities of A1, B1, C1 because of
key establishment with them. Now if they detect a node performing a
lookup for either A1, B1, or C1, they can identify that node as the initiator.
Since the initiator performs 9 lookups for the first stage nodes, the
probability of detecting this initiator is 1− (1− f)9, which translates into a
probability of 0.87 for f = 0.2. A similar attack strategy is applicable when
only two or even one node in the second stage is compromised. In the latter
scenario, the second stage knows the identity of only a single node in the
first stage, and if the initiator is detected looking up that node, then the
path is compromised. This occurs with probability 1− (1− f)3, which is
0.49 for f = 0.2. Similar to the continuous stage attack, notice that an
increase in r increases the probability that attackers can detect a lookup by
the initiator for the first node.
It is important to note that there are some false positives in the attack.
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Figure 4.4: False positives in bridging an honest first stage.
The false positives occur when a node (say A1) in the first stage is involved
in building more than one path. In such a scenario, more than one node
will look up A1, and the attackers may detect a lookup for A1 not done by
the actual initiator. We define x to be the number of paths that are being
constructed (by all nodes) at the same time as this one. A reasonable
number for x is N/100, which means that during this path construction, 1%
of all nodes also performed a concurrent path construction. A number
much larger than this (e.g. N/10) would mean that nodes are spending a
significant fraction of their time (10%) constructing paths, rather than
using them for anonymous communication. Also, if any nodes in the
network are not in active use, this will decrease x. Using the variable x to
model the amount of lookup traffic by other nodes, we can compute the
false positives as
1−
(
N − 1
N
)x(1−(1−f)r)
Figure 4.4 depicts the false positives for varying r using f = 0.2 and
N = 1000. Note that for x < N
100
, the false positives are less than 0.1%.
4.2.4 Bridging an Honest Stage
Salsa is also vulnerable to a bridging attack where attacker nodes separated
by a stage with all honest nodes are able to deduce that they are on the
same path. Consider the arrangement of nodes depicted in Figure 4.5. The
first stage has one malicious node A1, the second stage consists solely of
honest nodes, and the last node A3 is compromised. A1 knows the identities
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of all three nodes in the second stage, as it has performed a lookup for
them. Also, as part of the path building mechanism, one of the nodes in the
second stage will establish a key with the compromised third stage node A3.
In such a scenario, A1 and A3 can deduce that they are part of the same
path as they both observe a common honest node. Similarly, if any of the
nodes in the first stage are compromised and the last node is compromised,
the path is compromised. In such an attack the compromised nodes in the
first stage need not be selected as relays. Again, recall that increasing r
increases the chance of an attacker being present in a stage, resulting in a
higher probability of bridging an honest stage. The probability of false
positives in this scenario can be analyzed as 1− (N−1
N
)x, which for
x = N/100 and N = 1000 is less than 1%.
Figure 4.5: Bridging an honest stage.
4.2.5 Results
We now present experimental results for active path compromise attacks
and information leak attacks on Salsa. Our results have been computed by
modeling the Salsa path building mechanism as a stochastic activity
network in the Mo¨bius framework [18]. The input to the model is the
lookup bias, computed using our analytic model, as described in Chapter 3.
Figure 4.6 shows the chance of active path compromise attacks on Salsa
for varying levels of redundancy. It is easy to see that increasing r reduces
the fraction of compromised paths. For instance, at f = 0.2, 17% paths are
compromised using r = 3. The corresponding value for r = 6 is
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Figure 4.6: Conventional path compromise attacks: Increasing redundancy
counters active attacks.
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Figure 4.7: Information leak attacks: Increasing redundancy makes the
passive adversary stronger.
approximately 8%. This is not surprising, as increasing r reduces the
chance of both active attacks on lookups and attacks involving public key
modification.
The continuous stage attack and both our bridging attacks are examples
of passive attacks. Figure 4.7 shows the fraction of compromised paths
under the passive attacks. We can see that an increase in r increases the
effectiveness of the passive attacks, and is detrimental to anonymity. For
20% attackers, even for a small value of r = 3, the initiator can be identified
with probability 0.125. Higher values of r can increase the probability of
identifying the initiator to over 0.15. Note also that the bridging attack
significantly improves upon the previous attacks on Salsa: using only the
continuous stage attack, for r = 3, f = 0.2, anonymity is broken with a
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probability of only 0.048, less than half of what is possible with bridging.
The active path compromise attacks can be combined with passive
information leak attacks. Figure 4.8 shows the fraction of compromised
paths for all passive and active attacks. An interesting trend is observed
where increasing redundancy (beyond r = 2) is detrimental to security for
small values of f . This is in sharp contrast to conventional analysis; the
inclusion of information leak attacks have made the effect of passive attacks
more dominant over the effect of active attacks. There is a crossover point
at about 10% malicious nodes, after which increasing r reduces to
probability of path compromise. This is because active attacks are
dominant for higher values of f . Note that r = 2 results in significantly
worse security because of poor resilience to both lookup attacks and public
key modification attacks.
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Figure 4.8: All conventional and information leak attacks: For maximal
anonymity, r = 3 is optimal for small f . Note that there is a crossover
point at f = 0.1 when r = 6 becomes optimal.
This shows the tension between the passive and active attacks. There is
an inherent redundancy in the Salsa path building mechanism to counter
active attacks. However, the redundancy makes the passive adversary
stronger and provides more opportunities for attack. From Figure 4.9 we
can see that by conventional analysis, security provided by Salsa is close to
that of Tor (f 2). With our information leak attacks taken into account, for
f > 0.12, the security provided by Salsa is even worse than f .
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Note that for f > 0.12, fraction of compromised paths is greater than f .
4.2.6 Improvements to Salsa
We next consider whether simple changes to Salsa’s mechanisms would
provide a defense against our attacks. First, we consider Salsa using a PKI,
as in AP3. The public key modification attack would no longer work;
however, other active attacks on the lookup mechanism and our passive
information leak attacks would still apply. Figure 4.10 depicts the
probability of identifying the initiator under all active and passive attacks
in Salsa with PKI. Again, we can see the tension between active and
passive attacks. Increasing redundancy (beyond r = 2) is detrimental to
security for small values of f , because of the dominance of our information
leak attacks. There is a crossover point, after which active attacks become
dominant, and increasing r increases security. With the public key
modification attack gone, r = 2 becomes a more reasonable parameter, but
even with a PKI, the fraction of compromised paths increases from 8%
under conventional active attacks to more than 30% with our information
leak attacks taken into account.
Finally, we explore the effect of increasing the path length (l) on the
anonymity of Salsa. Figure 4.11 depicts the probability of identifying the
initiator for varying values of l. There is an interesting trade-off in
increasing the path length. On one hand, increasing l reduces the chance of
information leak attacks, because the attacker needs to bridge all stages.
On the other hand increasing l gives attackers more opportunities to launch
active attacks, thereby increasing the probability that last node is
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Figure 4.10: Salsa with a PKI—All conventional and information leak
attacks. Even with a PKI, the security of Salsa is much worse as compared
to conventional analysis.
compromised, which in turn gives attackers more observation points. This
is basically a cascading effect: the presence of a malicious node in each
stage increases the probability of presence of malicious nodes in the next
stage. For small values of f , passive attacks are stronger, therefore
increasing l increases security; but for higher f , the active attacks and the
cascading are dominant, therefore increasing l decreases security.
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Figure 4.11: Effect of varying the path length: Note that there is only
limited benefit of increasing path length.
We have proposed passive bridging attacks on Salsa that are based on
information leaks from lookups, and can be launched by a partial adversary.
Moreover, we have shown a trade-off between defenses against active and
passive attacks. Even at the optimal point in the trade-off, the anonymity
provided by the system is significantly worse than what was previously
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thought. This trade-off is present even in Salsa with a PKI. Moreover,
increasing path length in Salsa has only a limited benefit for the user
anonymity.
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CHAPTER 5
DENIAL OF SERVICE AGAINST SALSA
5.1 Selective DoS Attack
We now consider a selective denial-of-service attack on Salsa. Instead of
blanket denial-of-service attack, an adversary may selectively affect
reliability of the system in states that are hardest to compromise, thereby
causing the system to enter less secure states. The idea of selective DoS
attack is to deny service to trustworthy nodes so that user traffic moves
toward compromised nodes. The compromised nodes will try to abort the
tunnel building process whenever the tunnel cannot be compromised. A
malicious node can easily launch a denial of service by returning an
arbitrary result from a lookup. The Salsa tunnel building mechanism aborts
if the lookup information provided by the redundant r nodes in any stage is
inconsistent.1 Such selective DoS is both easier to carry out than an attack
on the entire system, and can be more effective; instead of driving the users
away from the system, they are presented with a less reliable, but still
functional system. Faced with poor reliability, many users will naturally
attempt the communication again, presenting more opportunities for attack.
The attackers should deny service in two cases. First, if the last node is
honest, and there is an attacker in the second last stage, that attacker will
perform DoS, unless all r nodes in that stage are malicious. (This can be
easily determined on the reception of r messages at attacker nodes
containing lookup requests for the identical r nodes in the next stage.)
Also, if the attacker nodes are selected to forward traffic in a tunnel, they
can deny service if the tunnel has not been compromised. The nodes will
perform traffic analysis on the first portion of the stream sent over a tunnel
1This behavior is not precisely specified in [5], but has been confirmed by the Salsa
authors in a private communication.
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and correlate it with all other streams observed by other attackers. If the
stream can be linked to both an initiator and a destination, the attackers
continue forwarding traffic; otherwise, they terminate the tunnel as it
cannot be compromised.
The attack algorithm is as follows:
if a stage is completely compromised then
emulate remaining hops via public key modification attack.
else
if the second-to-last stage has an attacker and the last node being
looked is honest then
return arbitrary information to DoS the tunnel
else
return correct results
end if
end if
if attacker selected to forward traffic then
perform traffic analysis
end if
if attackers cannot identify the source and destination of the tunnel after
a timeout then
stop forwarding traffic on that tunnel
end if
5.2 Analysis
We compare the performance of three attack methodologies on the Salsa
tunnel building mechanism. The first one consists of conventional active
attacks on lookups, our public key modification attack and end-to-end
timing analysis. The second methodology involves using the passive
information leak attacks, in addition to conventional active attacks. In the
third methodology, nodes try to selectively DoS the tunnels which are likely
not to be compromised. All other attacks are also included in this
methodology. In our analysis, we have assumed that a user strives for
perfect reliability. Our results have been computed by modeling the Salsa
tunnel building mechanism as a stochastic activity network in the Mo¨bius
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framework [18] as illustrated in Chapter 3. Figure 5.1 shows the fraction of
compromised tunnels for varying attacker ratios under the three attacks.
Our analysis shows that the current Salsa design is extremely vulnerable
to the selective DoS attack, especially for high attacker ratios. In fact, as
compared to the our own security analysis of 39.2% compromised tunnels
for an attacker ratio of f = 0.2 (the second attack methodology), the
selective DoS attack results in 71% compromised tunnels. Also, a majority
of all tunnels are compromised when f ≥ 0.17. This shows that the
selective DoS attack has devastating effects on the security of Salsa.
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Figure 5.1: Effect of selective DoS on Salsa tunnel building.
Given the massive reduction in anonymity made possible by the selective
DoS attack, we study whether other choices of r and l could better resist
this attack. We find that an increase in the number of nodes in a stage (r)
or the number of stages (l) does not improve system anonymity under
selective DoS.
Figure 4.8 shows the effect of varying r under information leak attacks.
We can see that for small values of f , passive information leak attacks
dominate and increasing redundancy increases the the fraction of
compromised tunnels. There is a crossover point at about f = 0.1, when
active attacks begin to dominate, and increasing redundancy reduces the
fraction of compromised tunnels. Figure 5.2 shows the effect of varying r on
the system anonymity under selective DoS attack. Again, we can see that
for small values of f , the passive information leak attacks dominate and
increasing redundancy reduces anonymity. Now, there is an interesting
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Figure 5.2: Effect of varying r.
tradeoff between selective DoS attack and active attacks on lookup.
Increasing redundancy mitigates conventional active attacks, but gives
more opportunities to the attackers to launch selective DoS. Because of the
selective DoS attack, the crossover point where increasing redundancy is
beneficial for anonymity has shifted to about f = 0.15. Observe that even
for f ≥ 0.15, the advantage offered by increasing redundancy is very small
(not worth the communication overhead of increasing redundancy).
Figure 4.11 shows the effect of varying the number of stages on the
system anonymity under information leak attacks with a fixed r = 3. We
can see that for small values of f , increasing l increases anonymity because
it makes passive information leak attacks harder to launch. However, there
is a crossover point at about f = 0.17, where increasing redundancy does
not help. This is because of the cascading effect of active attacks: at every
successive stage, the probability that nodes in that stage are compromised
increases.
Figure 5.3 shows the effect of varying the number of stages on the system
anonymity under selective DoS attack, for r = 3. We can see that for small
values of t, the benefit of increasing the number of stages to counter passive
attacks is very small, because an increase in the number of stages gives
more opportunities to the attackers to launch selective DoS attack. Also,
the crossover point where increasing l is counterproductive has fallen to
about f = 0.12. For f ≥ 0.12, increasing l reduces anonymity, because both
conventional active attacks and selective DoS attack become stronger. We
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conclude that r = 3 and l = 2 or 3 are optimal design choices.
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Figure 5.3: Effect of varying l.
5.3 Selective DoS in Lookups
The attack algorithm described above considers the ability of adversarial
nodes to deny service when they are part of the path construction
mechanism. The adversary could also launch a selective DoS attack on the
lookup mechanism. In fact, in our analysis, we have already considered one
form of selective DoS on lookup: when all of the redundant lookups are
compromised, and there is no malicious node within bounds, the lookup is
aborted (see Figure 3.1).
Recently, Tran et al. [21] introduced a new selective DoS attack on the
lookup. To resolve conflicting results from redundant lookups, the initiator
chooses the closest node that satisfies the bounds check. Tran et al. [21]
observed that if the target node is honest, and the adversary is not able to
compromise all redundant lookups, then it can simply return an invalid
node with an identifier very close to the target identifier. This can be done
by precomputing the hashes of all 232 IP addresses, and returning the
appropriate IP address. This attack greatly increases the abilty of malicious
nodes to deny service; only a single lookup path needs to be compromised
to carry out this attack.
We propose a simple defense to this attack: to resolve conflicting results
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from redundant lookups, the initiator can choose the closest IP address that
speaks the Salsa protocol. Using this defense, the probability of first stage
nodes being honest does not change from our lookup security analysis in
Chapter 3. However, for nodes in second and subsequent stages, the
initiator cannot directly verify if an IP address is part of the protocol, and
has to rely on intermediate nodes to perform this stage. Since some of the
malicious intermediate nodes may lie during the verification, the initiator
may again get conflicting results. For this scenario, we investigate an abort
on conflict policy.
We note that in the protocol analyzed by Tran et al. [21] as well as in our
proposed defense, each node in the first stage must contact all nodes in the
second stage, increasing the threat of information leaks. We will
incorporate this into our analysis as well. From Figure 5.4, we can see that
the user anonymity is even more reduced as compared to the previous case.
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Figure 5.4: Effect of varying r.
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CHAPTER 6
AN ENTROPY BASED APPROACH FOR
EVALUATION
6.1 Lookups
So far we had considered lookup anonymity in Salsa to be compromised
only if the first hop (local contact) is malicious. However information leaks
also exist when any of the nodes in the lookup path are malicious, and not
just the first hop. The difference is that when the first hop is malicious, the
lookup initiator is precisely identified whereas in other cases, the attacker
only learns some probabilistic information. We now present a complete
analysis of this information leak, where instead of using a binary metric of
identifying the lookup initiator, we use an entropy based anonymity metric.
This metric considers the distribution of potential initiators of the lookup,
as computed by the attackers, and computes its entropy:
H(I) = −
∑
i
pi log2 i (6.1)
where pi is the probability that node i was the initiator of the lookup.
Under some observation o we can compute the probability distribution
given o and compute the corresponding entropy H(I|o). To model the
entropy of the lookup as a whole, we compute a weighted average of the
entropy for each observation (including the null observation).
H(I|O) =
∑
o∈O
P (o)H(I|o) (6.2)
where P (o) is the probability of observation o occurring, and O is the set of
all observations. This is also known as the conditional entropy of I based
on observing O.
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6.1.1 Single Lookup
Clearly, when the lookup is not intercepted by the adversary (null
observation), the attacker does not learn any information and the entropy is
logH, where H denotes the set of honest nodes. Now, let us consider the
case when the lookup is intercepted by the adversary. The adversary can
approximate the identity of the initiator by using the observation o that the
previous hop prev = p in the lookup path is Y = y levels away from it in
the binary tree structure. We have that
H(I|O) =
∑
y,p
P (o = y, p)H(I|o = y, p) (6.3)
To compute the entropy of the lookup, we need to compute P (o = y, p)
and H(I|o = y, p). Let us first focus on P (o = y, p). We can decompose
P (o = y, p) by conditioning on the the event I = i. We have that
P (o = y, p) =
∑
i∈H
P (o = y, p|I = i) · P (I = i) (6.4)
where P (I = i) is the prior probability of node I being the initiator given by
P (I = i) =
1
|H|
(6.5)
We shall now compute P (o = y, p|I = i). Let us denote the distance
between node i and the target in terms of binary tree levels as D = di.
Observe that given I = i, there cannot be a jump (in terms of binary tree
levels) in the lookup path of size greater than di, relative to the next hop.
Thus we have that when di < y, then P (o = y, p|I = i) = 0. In the case
when y = 0, P (o = y, p|I = i) is simply equal to the probability of the first
hop being malicious (f) when p = i.
Next, we have the observation that a jump of size Y = y relative to the
malicious hop has a previous hop which is y levels away from the target
node. This means that when di = y, then P (o = y, p|I = i) is equivalent to
a jump from the initiator’s group being intercepted by a malicious node.
The probability of a particular node p being selected as the first hop in the
initiator’s group is G
N
. The probability of the jump being intercepted at the
second hop is f and the probability of observing y under these constraints
is 2
y−1
G
. To sum up, this event happens with probability G
N
· f 2
y−1
G
when p is
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in the initiators group, and with probability 0 otherwise.
Lastly, let us consider the case y < di. If we suppose that the lookup has
traversed L = l nodes so far (not including the final malicious hop), then
we require that these l nodes are honest and the final node is malicious.
This occurs with probability (1− f)l · f . We know that the first hop is
always in the initiator’s group and to get a jump of Y = y, the lookup also
traverses the subtree which is y levels away from the target (the selection
probability of which is 1
2
). Furthermore, the probability of selecting a
particular node p in this subtree is 1
2y−1
· G
N(1−f)
. With these constraints, the
probability of the lookup traversing the remaining l − 2 hops can be
computed as a selection problem of choosing l − 2 subtrees out of the
possible d− y− 1, where the probability of selection is 1
2
. This is a binomial
distribution with probability
(
d−y−1
l−2
)
· (1
2
)d−y−1.
Combining the above, we have that
P (o = y, p|I = i) =

f y = 0, i = p
G
N
· f · 2
y−1
G
i, p ∈ same group∑d−y+1
l=2 (1− f)
l · f · 1
2
1
2y−1
· G
N(1−f)
·
(
d−y−1
l−2
)
· (1
2
)d−y−1 · 2
y−1
G
otherwise
(6.6)
Using P (I = i) and P (o = y, p|I = i) from Equations (6.5) and (6.6), we
can now compute P (o = y, p) from Equation (6.4).
Let us now compute H(I|o = y, p). By definition, we have that
H(I|o = y, p) = −
∑
i∈H
P (I = i|o = y, p) logP (I = i|o = y, p) (6.7)
Since we have already computed P (o = y, p|I = i), P (I = i) and
P (o = y, p) in Equations (6.6), (6.5) and (6.4), we can use Bayesian
inference to compute P (I = i|o = y, p) as follows:
P (I = i|o = y, p) =
P (o = y, p|I = i) · P (I = i)
P (o = y, p)
(6.8)
By using P (o = y, p) from (6.4) and H(I|o = y, p) from (6.7), we can
compute the entropy of the lookup from Equation (6.3).
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6.1.2 Redundant Lookups
Let us denote the attackers observations for the r redundant lookups as
o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr.
H(I|O) =
∑
y1,p1
..
∑
yr,pr
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr)H(I|o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr)
(6.9)
Similar to the case of single lookup, we can condition the probability
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) on the event I = i. Using the observation that
the redundant lookups are independent given I = i we can compute
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) as follows:
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) =
∑
i∈H
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr|I = i) · P (I = i)
(6.10a)
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) =
∑
i∈H
r∏
j=1
P (oj = yj, pj|I = i) · P (I = i) (6.10b)
where P (o = y, p|I = i) and P (I = i) are given by equations (6.6) and
(6.5). Let us now compute H(I|o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr).
H(I|o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) =
−
∑
i∈H
P (I = i|o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) logP (I = i|o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr)
(6.11)
Again, we make use of Bayesian inference to combine information from
multiple observations as follows:
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Figure 6.1: Lookup entropy.
P (I = i|o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) =
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr|I = i) · P (I = i)
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr)
(6.12a)
P (I = i|o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr) =
∏r
j=1 P (o=yj, pj|I = i) · P (I = i)
P (o1 = y1, p1..or = yr, pr)
(6.12b)
Finally, we can use Equation (6.9) to compute the entropy of redundant
lookups. Figure 6.1 plots the entropy of the lookup as a function of the
fraction of compromised nodes in the system. The input parameters for our
model were N = 1000, g = 128. We can see that by considering all possible
information leaks from the lookup, the lookup entropy is considerably
reduced as compared to the scenario where we considered information leaks
only from the first hop. For instance, when the fraction of compromised
nodes is f = 0.2, incorporating all possible information leaks reduces the
entropy from approximately 5 to 3 for a redundancy parameter of r = 3.
This illustrates that our security evaluation for Salsa’s path building
mechanism is a conservative analysis, and the actual anonymity loss due to
information leaks via lookups would be even greater than our results
suggest.
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Figure 6.2: Circuit entropy.
6.2 Path Construction
Our entropy based analysis of lookups suggests that the anonymity
provided by the path construction mechansim is likely to be even lower
than our results shown in Chapter 4. This is because our earlier results on
path construction considered only scenarios where exact identification of
the initiator is possible, and ignored the significant amount of probabilistic
information that an adversary has.
Consider our attack that involves bridging an honest first stage - in this
setting, the adversary controls the final node, and has knowledge of at least
one node in the first stage. In our earlier results, we had considered the
user anonymity to be compromised if the adversary is able to exactly
identify the initiators based on its lookups for the node(s) in the first stage.
Instead, we can now compute the intiator entropy based on its lookups for
the first stage nodes. If the adversary knows x < r nodes in the first stage
(and the last node is compromised), then the initiator entropy is equivalent
to the lookup entropy with redundancy parameter x · r.
Figure 6.2 shows the reduction in the anonymity based on the additional
probabilistic information while bridging the first honest stage alone. We
have left a complete analysis of Salsa’s path building mechanism using the
entropy based metric as part of the future work.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
Secure routing in peer-to-peer networks has been the subject of a lot of
research [22, 23, 8, 5, 24]. We studied lookup mechanisms proposed by
Castro et al. [8] and Nambiar and Wright [5], focusing on the information
leak from lookups, and observed a trade-off between security and
anonymity of a lookup. Kapadia and Triandopoulos recently proposed
Halo [24], which is also based on redundant routing, and exhibits a similar
trade-off. Moreover, it uses very high redundancy levels as compared to
Salsa, and would make our information leak attacks more effective. There
have been some attempts to add anonymity to a lookup. Borisov [25]
proposed an anonymous DHT based on Koorde [26], which performs a
randomized routing phase before an actual lookup. Ciaccio [27] proposed
the use of imprecise routing in DHTs to improve sender anonymity. These
lookups were designed to be anonymous, but not secure: an active
adversary could easily subvert the path of the lookup. As such, neither
lookup mechanism can be used to build anonymous circuits.
Danezis and Clayton [28] studied attacks on peer discovery and route
setup in anonymous peer-to-peer networks such as Tarzan [6]. They
proposed a node knowledge profiling attack and showed that unless a node
learns about a vast majority of the network, the attackers would be able to
link it to its traffic with high probability. Note that this attack assumed a
global passive adversary, escaping the issue of detecting lookups. We have
shown that even a partial adversary can make observations about a large
fraction of lookups that occur in the P2P network. Recently, Bauer et
al. [29] proposed a bridging attack in Tor where attacker nodes sandwiching
an honest node can correlate the path even before a packet is sent. This
attack is similar to our bridging attack on Salsa, except that we also utilize
information leaks from lookups, and consider the issue of false positives.
Reiter and Rubin [30] proposed the predecessor attack, which was later
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extended by Wright et al. [31, 32, 33]. In this attack, an attacker tracks an
identifiable stream of communication over multiple communication rounds
and logs the preceding node on the path. To identify the initiator, the
attacker uses the observation that initiator is more likely to be the
predecessor than any other node in the network. For peer to peer
anonymous communication systems like Salsa, the number of rounds
required by predecessor attack to identify the initiator with high
probability is inversely proportional to the probability of success of end to
end timing analysis. This means that defenses that minimize the
probability that both the first and last nodes are attackers also increase
resilience against predecessor attacks.
Similar to predecessor attacks, there is a thread of research that deals
with degradation of anonymity over a period of time. Berthold et al. [34]
and Raymond [13] propose intersection attacks that aim to compromise
sender anonymity by intersecting sets of users that were active at the time
the intercepted message was sent, over multiple communication rounds.
Similarly, Kesdogan et al. [35] use intersection to find recipients of a given
users message. A statistical version of this attack was proposed by
Danezis [36] and later extended by Mathewson and Dingledine [37]. These
attacks typically require an adversary to observe a significant fraction of
the network. Information leaks in peer-to-peer systems, however, can allow
even a partial adversary to make observations about a large fraction of
lookups and path building, and can therefore form a basis of effective
statistical intersection and disclosure attacks.
An important point of our paper is that, when building anonymous
systems, it is important not to abstract away the properties of the system
that can affect anonymity. Similar in spirit to ours, a lot of recent research
has focused on details abstracted away by conventional analysis models to
break the anonymity of the system. Such details include congestion and
interference [38, 39], clock skew [40], heterogeneous path latency [41, 39],
the ability to monitor Internet exchanges [42] and reliability [20]. Due to
lack of space, we only briefly discuss the last two attacks. Conventional
anonymity models of Tor view a connection from a client to a server as
point to point link, and abstract away the fact that this connection passes
through the internet routers. Murdoch and Zielin´ski [42] showed that
Internet exchange-level adversaries were capable of observing a vast
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majority of this traffic, and could degrade user anonymity by performing
end-to-end timing analysis. Borisov et al. [20] proposed a selective-DoS
attack on anonymous communication, and showed that attackers could
selectively affect the reliability of the system in states that are hardest to
compromise. Selective-DoS attack affects peer-to-peer anonymous
communication the most, because of the added complexity of knowing only
a subset of the nodes in the network.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
Peer-to-peer approaches to anonymous communication have the potential
to eliminate the scalability concerns and central vulnerability points of
current anonymity systems like Tor. A key challenge in peer-to-peer
systems is the ability to locate relays for anonymous communication.
The secure lookup mechanism in Salsa uses redundant routing, which
enables a relatively small fraction of attackers to observe a large number of
lookups in the network. Attackers are thus able to act as a near global
passive adversary and use this to break the anonymity of the system.
We have analyzed the security of Salsa, under both active and passive
attacks. Salsa incorporates redundancy into the path building mechanism,
to counter the lookup bias introduced by active adversaries. This makes
salsa vulnerable to several passive attacks, including our bridging attacks
based on information leaks from lookups. We have demonstrated the
tension that exists between while defending against both active and passive
adversaries. Defending against active adversaries requires increasing
redundancy, which increases the threat of passive attacks. Salsa was
previously reported to tolerate upto 20% compromised nodes, but our
results show, with information leaks taken into account, over a quarter of
all tunnels are compromised. Moreover, we show that the tension between
active and passive attacks is fundamental in the sense it even exists in Salsa
with a PKI. Also, increasing path lengths to counter our passive attacks
only has a limited benefit, and in some cases, it even reduces anonymity.
We also showed that Salsa is vulnerable to a selective DoS attack, where
an adversary denies service to a user only when it is unable to break user
anonymity. Selective DoS has a devastating effect on the security of Salsa;
an adversary with 20% compromised nodes can compromise more than 70%
of the paths.
Finally, we perform a first step towards an entropy based evaluation of
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Salsa; instead of considering information leaks when only the first step in
the lookup mechanism is compromised, we analyze all possible sources of
information leaks. We leave a complete analysis of Salsa’s path building
mechansim using the entropy metric as future work. Our results
demonstrate that information leaks are an important part of anonymity
analysis of a system and that new advances in the state of the art of P2P
anonymous communication are needed.
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APPENDIX A
AP3
AP3 [43] is an anonymous communication system built on top of
Pastry [44]. The essence of AP3 operation is similar to Crowds [45], where
a random walk over all of the nodes in the system is used to forward
requests while concealing the initiator’s identity. In both AP3 and Crowds,
a node A who wants to send a message to a node B first picks a random
relay F1 to forward the message. F1 then flips a weighted coin, and with
probability p it chooses another relay, F2, and forwards the request there.
With probability 1− p, F1 delivers the message directly to the recipient B.
Therefore, a message is forwarded through a path of nodes, all of which
are selected randomly. The path length follows a geometric distribution,
with the expected length being 1
1−p
. We can assume that some of the relays
will be malicious and will try to guess the identity of the initiator. However,
due to the stochastic nature of the forwarding, such relays will have a hard
time telling whether they received a message from the initiator directly, or
from another relay. Reiter and Rubin first analyzed the probability that the
initiator is correctly identified [45]; we review the terminology used in their
analysis here, as we will extend it in later sections.
Let Hk denote the event that the first attacker in the forwarding path
occupies the kth position, where the initiator is at the 0th. Let
Hk+ = Hk ∨Hk+1 ∨Hk+2 ∨ ... and let I denote the event that attackers
identified the initiator correctly. Then, given that an attacker intercepts a
message, the chance that the initiator guessed correctly is P (I|H1+). This
can be further decomposed as
P (I|H1+) =
P (I ∧H1+)
P (H1+)
=
P (H1)P (I|H1) + P (H2+)P (I|H2+)
P (H1+)
(A.1)
Note that P (I|H1) = 1, since in this case the initiator is identified
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correctly, and P (I|H2+) = 0. If we let f represent the fraction of nodes that
are compromised, then
P (I|H1+) =
P (H1)
P (H1+)
=
f∑∞
i=1 (p(1− f))
i−1 f
Reiter and Rubin proposed the notion of probable innocence as
happening whenever the true initiator is identified with a probability less
than 1/2. By solving P (I|H1+) < 1/2 for f , we can see that as long as
f < 1− 1
2p
, probable innocence will be assured. For example, with p = 0.75,
up to 33% nodes can be malicious without compromising probable
innocence. By increasing p, even larger fractions of compromised nodes can
be tolerated, up to the limit of 50% when p = 1. (Of course, larger p results
in longer paths.)
The chief difference between AP3 and Crowds is the manner in which the
relays are chosen. Both aim to pick a relay at random out of all the nodes
in the system, but Crowds assumes that all nodes know about all other
nodes, which does not scale. AP3 uses the secure lookup due to Castro et
al. to locate relays.
A.1 Castro et al.’s Secure Lookup
It has been recognized that unprotected DHTs are extremely vulnerable to
attacks on the lookup mechanism. First of all, malicious nodes can perform
a Sybil attack [14] and join the network many times, increasing the fraction
f . Second, they can intercept lookup requests and return incorrect results
by listing a colluding malicious node as the closest node to a key, increasing
the fraction of lookups that return malicious nodes. Finally, they can
interfere with the routing table maintenance and cause the routing tables of
honest nodes to contain a larger fraction of malicious nodes; this will
increase the chance that a lookup can be intercepted and the result can be
subverted.
Castro et al.[8] designed a suite of mechanisms to counter these attacks.
We discuss their mechanisms in context of Pastry [44], a structured
peer-to-peer overlay network, though they are applicable to other DHTs.
They proposed:
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• Secure node identifier assignment: Each node is issued a certificate by
a trusted authority, which binds the node identifier with a public key.
The authority limits the number of certificates and prevents Sybil
attacks.
• Secure routing table maintenance: Even with secure node ID
assignment, attackers can maliciously influence routing table
construction. The Pastry routing algorithms allow flexibility in
selecting a neighbor for each slot, which is used for optimizing latency
or other metrics. Attackers can exploit this flexibility by suggesting
malicious choices for these slots. Secure routing table maintenance
eliminates this flexibility by creating a parallel, constrained routing
table where each slot can have only a single possible node, as verified
by secure lookup. This solution ensures that, on average, only a
fraction f of a node’s neighbors will be malicious.
• Secure lookups (secure message forwarding): For secure lookups, a
two-phase approach is employed. The message is routed via the
normal routing table (optimized for latency) and a routing failure test
is applied. If the test detects a failure, redundant routing is used and
all messages are forwarded according to the constrained routing table.
The failure test makes use of the observation that the density of
honest nodes is greater than the density of malicious nodes. The idea
behind redundant routing is to ensure that multiple copies of
messages are sent to the key root via diverse routes. Note that Castro
et al. consider the problem of securely routing to the entire replica
set, for which a neighbor anycast mechanism is also used. We refer
the reader to [8] for a detailed explanation of the techniques.
Used together, these techniques are quite effective at ensuring that a
lookup returns the actual closest node to the randomly chosen identifier,
which in turn suggests that it is malicious with probability f . However, the
secure lookup mechanism generates many extra messages: the routing
failure test involves contacting the entire root set of a node (L immediate
neighbors in the node ID space), and redundant routing sends a request
across several paths. These messages let attackers detect when a lookup has
been performed between two honest nodes with high probability. The
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probability of detecting the lookup initiator can be approximated as
1− (1− f)L+log2b N , which is quite high for the typical values of L = 16 and
b = 4. In Figure 4.2, we plot the probability of detection of the lookup
initiator as a function of the fraction of compromised nodes f . We can see
that a small fraction of 5% compromised nodes can detect the lookup
initiator more than 60% of the time. Moreover, when the fraction of
compromised nodes is about 10%, the lookup initiator is revealed 90% of
the time.
A.2 The E1 Attack
To pick a relay, a node performs a secure lookup in the Pastry DHT for a
random key. This, in turn, can be used to break probable innocence. In
addition to the base observation—node A used malicious node B as a
relay—the malicious nodes have an extra observation point: whether any
other node has performed a lookup for node A. We will define the event E1
as the case when no lookups for A have been detected. (E1 implies H1+.)
We can then calculate the probability P (I|E1):
P (I|E1) =
P (I ∧ E1)
P (E1)
To calculate P (E1), we need to consider two cases: either A is, in fact,
the initiator (H1), or some other node, Q, forwarded the request to A
(H2+). In the former case, E1 will be true unless there is another spurious
lookup (false positive) for A due to another request that is detected by the
attackers. We call the spurious lookup event FP . In the latter scenario, we
need two things to happen: first, no spurious lookup has happened, and
second, the lookup from Q to A was not detected. We call this second event
Q. Figure A.1 represents the analysis of the two cases.
Therefore, we can express E1 as
E1 ≡ (H1 ∧ ¬FP) ∨ (H2+ ∧Q ∧ ¬FP)
Because H1 and H2+ are exclusive, and FP and Q are independent from
H1, H2+, and each other, we can write
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(a) E1 ∧H1 (b) E1 ∧H2+
Figure A.1: Information leak in AP3.
P (E1) = P (H1)P (¬FP) + P (H2+)P (¬FP)P (Q)
Therefore,
P (I|E1) =
P (H1)P (¬FP)
P (H1)P (¬FP) + P (H2+)P (¬FP)P (Q)
=
P (H1)
P (H1) + P (H2+)P (Q)
(A.2)
Note that P (I|E1) can be computed independently of P (FP ); this is
because we are conditioning on E1, which implies that no spurious lookups
have occurred. Note also that as P (Q) grows smaller, the fraction
approaches closer to 1. As we noted in Chapter 4, with the secure lookup
due to Castro et al., P (Q) is quite small, even for small f .
Figure A.2 shows the attacker confidence as a function of the fraction of
the nodes that are compromised for varying p, using N = 1000, b = 4 and
L = 16. Our calculations show that to achieve P (I|E1) < 1/2, we require
that f < 0.05, which is much smaller than the previously computed limit of
f < 0.33. Furthermore, the theoretical limit for the fraction of attackers
that AP3 can tolerate can be computed by letting p→ 1, which is
approximately 10% attackers. Again, this limit is much smaller than the
conventional figure of 50%. This shows the fundamental tension that is
encountered by AP3. The default Pastry mechanisms provide little defense
against active adversaries who will try to disrupt the lookup process,
dramatically increasing P (H1) and thus P (I|H1+). Castro et al. suggested
mechanisms solve this problem, but introduced another, as the lookup is no
longer anonymous and can be observed by malicious nodes.
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Figure A.2: P (I|E1).
A.3 The Ei Attack
In addition to E1, the can use the observation that if there is a chain of
lookups leading to the predecessor node, then the first node in the chain is
more likely to be the initiator than any other node. For instance, we can
define E2 as the case when attackers observe a lookup by some node Q of
the previous hop (P), but do not detect a lookup for Q. Furthermore, the
previous hop (P) should not have looked up any other nodes. We now
compute P (I|E2). Depending on the probabilities of P (E2 ∧H1) and
P (E2 ∧H2), the attacker may guess that P or Q is the initiator of the path.
These probabilities will depend on the chance of a false positive lookup
detection, which in turn depends on the amount of lookup traffic elsewhere
in the network. We define x to be the number of paths that are being
constructed (by all nodes) at the same time as this one. A reasonable
number for x is N/100, which means that during this path construction, 1%
of all nodes also performed a concurrent path construction. A number
much larger than this (e.g. N/10) would mean that nodes are spending a
significant fraction of their time (10%) constructing paths, rather than
using them for anonymous communication. Also, if any nodes in the
network are not in active use, this will decrease x.
Given x, we can compute the false positive probability α using the
following equation:
α = 1−
(
N − 1
N
)x“1−(1−f)L+log2b N ”
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Figure A.3: P (I|E2).
It is easy to see that as long as the false positive detection probability is
small, P (E2 ∧H1)≪ P (E2 ∧H2). Therefore, the attacker strategy here
would be to guess the node (Q) looking up the previous hop to be the
initiator. Therefore P (I|E2 ∧H1) = 0 and P (I|E2 ∧H3+) = 0.
P (I|E2) =
P (I|E2 ∧H2)P (E2 ∧H2)
P (E2 ∧H1) + P (E2 ∧H2) + P (E2 ∧H3+)
(A.3)
Figure A.3 plots P (I|E2) as a function of f for varying p. The trend for
P (I|E2) is very similar to our analysis of P (I|E1). Again, we can see that
for p = 0.75, the maximum fraction of attackers that AP3 can handle while
maintaining P (I|E2) < 1/2 is only 5%. Due to lack of space, we have
limited our analysis to only P (I|E1) and P (I|E2). In this sense, ours is a
conservative analysis and the attackers can utilize many more observation
points. For instance, one could define a general event Ei analogous to E2. If
the false positives are small, P (I|Ei) can be approximated as
P (I|Ei) =
P (Hi)
P (Hi) + P (H(i+1)+)P (Q)
The above formulation neglects false positives and is only an
approximation. However, in practice, the approximation works quite well.
In Figure A.3, we can see that the results of the approximate model are
quite close to the actual formulation that takes false positives into account.
Note that the metrics P (I|E1) and P (I|E2) are only indicative of the
attacker confidence in identifying the initiator given the observations E1
and E2. They do not consider the probabilities of the attackers observing
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E1 and E2. We use the entropy metric of anonymity [46, 47] to take this
into account. The metric relies on computing the entropy of the distribution
of possible initiators of a path. In the case of Ei, the probability that the
identified node is the initiator is P (I|Ei), and the probability assigned to
any other node is 1−P (I|Ei)
N−1
.1 Let H(Ei) be the entropy of the system under
the observation Ei. Then, the average entropy can be computed as follows:
H = P (E1)H(E1) + P (E2)H(E2) + (1− P (E1)− P (E2)) log2 N
Figure A.4 plots the entropy as a function of f , for varying p, using
N = 1000. Note that higher values of p have lower entropy, and are thus
considered to provide worse anonymity under the entropy metric. This is
because with higher path lengths, the observation E2 (and E3, E4, . . .) is
more frequent, even though each observation has lower confidence. The
latter effect dominates, highlighting one of the open questions in anonymity
analysis: is it better to have an anonymity system that allows weak attacks
frequently, or strong attacks rarely?
1This is a slight simplification; the entropy metric can take into account that, for
example, in the case of E2, P is more likely to be the initiator than a random node.
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